The Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) and the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) had their origins in the studies and investigations conducted as the result of the TMI-2 accident. The President's Commission (Kemeny Commission) 1/ critized NRC for not examining the man-machine interface, over-emphasizing equipment, ignoring human beings, and tolerating outdated technology in control rooms. The Commission's Special Inquiry Group (Rogovin Report) 
The TMI Action Plan called for NRC to require that operating reactor licensee and applicants for operating licensees perform a detailed control room design review to identify and correct design deficiencies. The review should include an assessment of control room layout, the adequacy of the information provided, the arrangement and identification of important controls and instrumentation displays, the usefulness of the audio and visual alarm system, the information recording and recall capability, lighting, and other considerations of human factors that have an impact on operator effectiveness. The detailed control room design review was expected to take more than a year. Therefore, NRC should require that those applicants for operating licenses who are unable to complete the detailed review prior to fuel loading make a preliminary assessment of their control room to identify significant human factors and instrumentation problems and establish a schedule approved by NRC for correcting deficiencies. These applicants are also required to complete the more detailed control room review after licensing. Prior to the initiation of the detailed reviews, NRC was to formulate design review guidelines to be used by licensees and applicants to assist in the identification of design weaknesses.
The Action Plan also called for NRC Verification that selected design improvements will provide the necessary correction 8. Verification that improvements will not introduce new HEDs On-site pre-implementation audits are similar to inprogress audits except they are conducted after the DCRDR has been completed but prior to implementation of major control room modifications.
SPDS Requirements
The appear to be using NUREG-0700 in their surveys although some take specific exception to certain guidelines.
Most utilities seem to haye developed adequate programs for the assessment of human engineering discrepancies (HEDs) to determine which HEDs are significant and should be corrected. The same is true for the prom grams for the selection of design improvements, The difficulty in this area often has been in clearly describing the programs in summary form in Program Plans. However, our on-site audits have led us to conclude that most programs audited were satisfactory. As might be expected, a finding by NRC of adequacy of these programs, does not necessarily mean that NRC will always agree with the results of the review in detail.
Many utilites used mockups for verifying that selected design improvements provide the necessary correction and do not introduce new HEDs.
The program for coordination of control room improvements with changes from other programs such as SPDS, operator training, Regulatory Guide 1.97 instrumentation, and upgraded emergency operating procedures proposed by a number of utilites needed improvement. The team developing improved emergency operating procedures and the DCRDR team often seemed to have inadequate communications. In several instances the schedules for the different programs did not permit optimum interaction. Several programs, however, appeared to provide good coordination by using a management group composed of the leaders of each of the efforts to review and approve the work involving all of the NFJREG-0737, Supplement 1, effort.
SPDS Programs
As previously stated, NRC is performing two types of SPDS reviews. For plants undergoing review for issuance of an operating license, the staff performs a pre-implementation review for conformance with the requirements of NUREG-0737, Supplement 1. On request of operating reactor licensees and vendors with generic SPDS designs, the NRC performs a pre-implementation review similar to that performed for operating license reviews. The review of operating reactor SPDSs where no pre-implementation review has been requested is a much more abbreviated review. This review is only to determine if a serious safety question is posed by the licensee's proposed system or if the licensee's analysis is seriously inadequate.
Of the more detailed SPDS reviews, the staff has completed two SPDS reviews for plants under operating license review. A number of other such reviews are in progress. The design verification review of the Westinghouse generic SPDS has been completed. The review of the General Electric SPDS (Emergency Response Information System -ERIS) is in progress. The licensees for four operating plants have requested pre-implementation reviews, two of which are presently in progress.
The safety analysis and implementation plans of SPDSs for 43 operating units not requesting pre-implementation reviews have been reviewed. These reviews have resulted in the issuance of Safety Evaluation Reports for 11 units and requests for additional information concerning 32 units. In each of the Safety Evaluation Reports issued to date, the staff concluded that continued implementation of the SPDSs may proceed. However, in a number of the evaluations, the staff made recommendations to be considered during SPDS implementation.
Several years ago the NRC staff believed that there would be a relatively small number of standard SPDS designs. The basis for this belief was the cost of software and hardware verification and validation programs. Later, however, meetings with EPRI and others revealed that in excess of twenty vendors had announced their intention of marketing SPDSs. A recent check of the SPDS submittals for 62 nuclear units revealed that ten vendors are supplying the SPDSs for 38 of the units, and the SPDSs for 24 of the units are in-house designs. In almost all cases where vendor designs are being used, there are fairly significant plant-specifc variations. It now appears that there will be more vendor designs that we initially expected, but fewer than the 20 that later appeared possible. However, because of the plant specific variations of vendor designs and the number of in-house designs, there will be a large number of designs and design variations to be reviewed by the NRC staff.
Our reviews of SPDS programs have revealed some encouraging signs. Many utilities seem to be pursuing their SPDS Programs with enthusiasm with the expectation that the SPDS will improve control room operation. In a number of cases the SPDS is only a part of a general upgrade in the ability to manage data and information for control room operators through the use of computers.
There appears to be some excellent work being done in the development of systems for validating data to be displayed on SPDSs. The extent to which this R and D validation will be applied in the industry as a whole is unknown. The validity of the data displayed on the SPDS is extremely important. In addition to improving the quality of the SPDS, operator involvement should improve the acceptance of the SPDS by the operating crews.
The bad features we have seen do not appear to be generic. We have seen a few cluttered top level displays. There are instances of labeling, nomenclature, and color conventions on SPDSs that are at odds with those on the control boards. In a few cases we find that verification and validation is not implemented in the early phase of software development with the expectation of finding errors in later integrated testing. We believe that verification and validation programs geared to identifying errors earlier in the design and development process will result in more nearly optimum correction of errors. We are also finding that many safety analyses and implementation plans lack the information required for NRC to complete its review. Often omitted are the basis for parameter selection, discussion of data validation, discussion of the human factors design including format examples, discussion of the verification and validation program, and discussion of the isolation from electrical or electronic interference with equipment and sensors that are used in safety systems.
14.o Summary Observations
The NRC staff has reviewed the DCRDR Program Plans for a large fraction of the control rooms in nuclear power plants but has reviewed the Summary Reports of completed reviews for only a few control rooms. We have reviewed the SPDS Safety Analyses and Implementation Plans for about one-third of the SPDSs but have conducted no reviews of completed designs. Our observations, therefore, are based more on utility plans and programs that are in progress than on completed programs.
Our observations do not apply to all control rooms or all utility programs but are general impressions based on our review to date. The attitude of a number of utilities is encouraging. They seem more interested in improving their control rooms and providing effective SPDSs than in merely me'eting minimum NRC requiireients.
Operators are deeply involved in many utility DCRDR and SPDS programs. The function and task analyses has probably caused more difficulties than any other DCRDR requirement. We have noted no generic problems in SPDS design. However, we have noted several instances of cluttered displays, labeling, nomenclature, and color conventions at odds with those on the control boards; and verification and validation not included in the early phases of the SPDS development. On the other hand, we have seen some well human factored displays and function-based keyboard designs and some excellent verification and validation programs.
